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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAVID J. SMITH, FOR THE ESTATE 
OF SALLIE L. SMITH, LORETTA E., 
SMITH, FIDDLERS CANYON 
DEVELOPMENT, LTD., AND 
TRADERS INTERNATIONAL 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CEDAR CITY MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Appeal No. 20070501 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
L SMITH HAS PRESERVED ALL ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL 
In its Brief of Appellee, Cedar City ("the City") erroneously claims that Smith has 
not adequately preserved the issues on appeal for this Court's review. Brief of Appellee p. 2. 
Smith has preserved all issues from which he now appeals, as evidenced by Brief of 
Appellant, the record provided to this Court for review of the issues, and further evidenced as 
detailed herein. 
UT. R. APP. P. 24 (a)(5)(A)-(B) provides that opening briefs in support of issues on 
appeal must include "citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court; or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial 
court." The Utah Supreme Court has said that, when reviewing whether trial courts have had 
the opportunity to rule on issues that are subsequently appealed, the reviewing court should 
ascertain three factors, which are "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the 
issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority." Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, If 14, 
48 P.3d 968, citing Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). In 
Badger, the Utah Supreme Court held that, "once trial counsel has raised an issue before the 
trial court, and the trial court has considered the issue, the issue is preserved for appeal." Id. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has said, "[w]e therefore hold that, when an issue is 
argued before the [trial] court and the court makes a definitive ruling, as is the case here, the 
issue is adequately preserved for appeal." Salt Lake City v. Holtman, 806 P.2d 235, 237 
(Utah App. 1991) (alteration added). The Utah Supreme Court has also indicated that, "[w]e 
have often stated that 'issues not raised at trial cannot be argued for the first time on appeal' 
.... unless the petitioner demonstrates that 'plain error' occurred or 'exceptional 
circumstances1 exist." State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1 ^ f 41, 63 P.3d 731, citing Monson v. 
Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996) {quoting State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 
(Utah 1994)). 
In the instant case, Smith appeals from an order of the trial court dismissing the action. 
In his opening brief, Smith presents the following issues to this Court for review: the failure 
of the trial court to convert the City's Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary 
2 
Judgment pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; the violation of Smith's due process 
rights due to the trial court's failure to consolidate the instant case with a previous case in 
issuing its Dismissal Order; and the reliance of the trial court upon an affidavit that swore to 
the existence of a contract that was never admitted to the trial court as evidence. Brief of 
Appellant pp. 1 -3. The Brief of Appellee claims that Smith has not preserved these issues with 
the trial court for this Court's review. Brief of Appellee at pp. 2, 12-13. The following is a 
citation to the record, evidencing the preservation of these issues for this Court's review. 
Smith's first issue on appeal is a claim that the trial court erred when it failed to 
convert the City's Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment. This issue is 
argued more particularly below, however, the following shows the preservation of this issue 
on appeal. The trial court issued an order titled Stipulated Order Vacating Trial; Dismissing 
Plaintiff's Second and Third Causes of Action with Prejudice and on the Merits; Setting a 
Briefing Schedule RE: to Plaintiff's First Cause of Action; and Preserving Factual for Future 
Hearing. Ibid., pp. 1-3. In this order, the trial court set a briefing schedule, directing the 
parties to prepare a memorandum of law with points and authorities and argument for the 
trial court's determination of Smith's entitlement to a setoff as a matter of law. Id. at p. 2. 
Smith timely filed the Trial Brief as directed by the trial court's order, which requested 
an evidentiary hearing. Trial Brief at p. 3. Smith further alleged in the Trial Brief that the 
City had taken and or damaged private property which entitled Smith to just compensation 
under Utah law; that the SID was invalid since it was constructed upon private property; and 
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that the flood control structure resulted in taxes being levied against Smith. Id. at pp. 3-9. 
The City responded in a motion titled Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's "Trial Brief and 
Motion to Dismiss, alleging that Smith had failed to state a claim for which relief could be 
granted. Ibid, at p. 1. The City's response disputed Smith's claims arguing, among other 
things, that Smith was barred from relief due to claim and issue preclusion and that the SID 
was valid. Id. at pp. 5-14. Smith responded to the City's response by filing Reply to 
Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's "Trial Brief' and Motion to Dismiss which included an 
amended statement of facts. Ibid, at p. 2. Smith argued in the reply that he was entitled to just 
compensation before the condemnation proceedings commenced, that issue and claim 
preclusion did not apply to the instant matter, and again argued that the SID was invalid due 
to its construction upon private property. Id. at pp. 3-15. 
The City then filed a Motion to Strike certain portions of Smith's amended statement 
of facts, alleging that the facts were unsupported by affidavit, discovery material, or 
documentation. Ibid, at p. 1. Smith responded by filing Response in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Strike which included the affidavit of Frank Nichols. Ibid. Attachment 
~A~. The City filed Reply to Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Strike, which included an affidavit and part of a deposition as exhibits. Ibid. Exhibit #1 and 
Exhibit #2. The City relied upon its exhibits to demonstrate that it had not taken private 
property and was not required to provide Smith with just compensation. Id. at p. 1. 
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The trial court granted the City's Motion to Dismiss in its Order (in jtum^ Lh ienda*" 's 
'1 lotU m J"( > Dismi s. s ("Dismissal Orde* tate a claim for 
which relief could be granted. Ibid, at p. 3. However, the trial court granted the City's Motion 
to Dismiss as one for summary judgment as it relied upon documents outside the pleadings in 
ml ill iiiiisscu hi .in [i mi in loui \ (i ,1', aijjtH il III Siiiilli 1t |M*mn • mu I (fin (n<ii \ \ \\\t lulu >l 
properly convert the City's Motion to Dismiss to one for summary judgment, but onl) 
determined in its decision that it would grant it as one for summary judgment. Id. at p 7 
When oral argument - ; e itiank 1H:IUH illir IIII.II MHHC1 I )Miins^ iil I irdcr, Snnlh M;JSUIM <• 
that the trial court would treat the City's Motion to Dismiss as one for summary judgment and 
therefore did not present further evidence at that time to support the pleadings for relief. 
Therefore, Smith properly pres« i 
As lor Smith's sa nnif issue loi i'v\ lew on appeal, the Dismissal Order relied upon the 
outcome of a previous action, that led to the filing of the instant matter, in its determination 
that this issue had previously been resolved in another order, hI Smith moved to
 conSolidate 
111* ruses us i \ idem \ ill li'i Ihe OMIMII.II ;H lion w hit h was denied by the trial court. Therefore, 
Smith is within his bounds to request review on this issue by this Court. 
Smith's third issue on appeal is preserved due to the record being vacant of any 
contract in suppo 
said affidavit in its Dismissal Order and, at the same time, admonishing Smith for failing to 
provide any evidence outside the pleadings to support his allegations. Id. at pp. 2-4 The 
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Dismissal Order is the order from which Smith now appeals. Smith has taken his issues for 
review directly from the Dismissal Order which appropriately requires this Court's review. 
Furthermore, Smith's opening brief includes sufficient "citation to the record showing that 
the issue[s] w[ere] preserved in the trial court." UT. R. APP. P. 24 (a)(5)(A). However, this 
Court should ascertain whether the issues have been "raised in a timely fashion," that the 
issues were "specifically raised," and that Smith has "introduced supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority." Brookside at 11 14. Smith specifically raised the issues which he 
now appeals in a timely fashion in his Trial Brief and subsequent replies to the trial court. 
The trial court rejected those issues, which now places those issues before this Court. 
Therefore, under Badger, the trial court considered the issues in its Dismissal Order, which 
preserved the issues for appeal and this Court's review. Id The trial court's Dismissal Order 
is a definitive order from which Smith now appeals. Salt Lake City at 237. Smith is not 
barred from asserting his issues on appeal because he has preserved the issues with the trial 
court. Id. Hence, the City's contention that Smith has not properly preserved the issues 
should be rejected by this Court. 
A. The Complaint Sufficiently Alleged Smith's Claim against the City and 
Did Not Require a Showing of Compliance with the Statutes Governing 
Special Improvement Districts. 
This Court has previously stated that, "[a] complaint must contain a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Busche v. Salt Lake 
County, 2001 UT App. 111, H6,26 P.3d 862, citingUT. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (quotations omitted). 
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A complaint can be dismissed if it fails to set forth the plain statement showing entillei niwil (o 
•r|iH kfsa! on (In1' fiulinv In sfad ;i rl.imi I'M w hirh idiri in n In," pranfai ,Y„ r I •r.R.CJV.P. 
12(b)(6). However, this Court went on to state in Busche, that "[t]he claim need not be 
specific, rather, under Utah's liberal notice pleading requirements, all that is required is that 
linn iili'juliiijis be Miifkit ill I i I>M f* fiimr imtn \ nl llir iiiilmv iiiini Insi nl llir i hum issrrtedand 
a general indication of the type of litigation involved." Busche at U6 citing Fishbaugh v. 
Utah Power & Light 969 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah 1998) (quotations omitted). 
Il IK I lliih Siiiifiii iiiiiiii I luiiiil lllhi i fin ii(nir,!\ i\\u\\\ t d lln IIIIIII vn\ niiiiiLi plcmliii|.»s in 
civil actions and stated as follows: 
Thus our interpretation of the pleading rules must turn upon the fact that 
"[w]hat [the parties] are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an 
opportunity to meet them. When this is accomplished, that is all that is 
required." Id.; see also Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 667 (Utah 
1985); F.M.A. Fin. Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, 672 
(1965). In Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 
1982), we reaffirmed our holding in Cheney, stating that the rules " 'allow 
examination into and settlement of all issues bearing upon the controversy,' 
with latitude for proof that extends beyond the pleadings, where appropriate." 
(Citing Cheney, 14 Utah 2d at 211,3 81 P.2d at 91.) These holdings reflect the 
philosophy of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53(c), which states that "every 
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is 
rendered is entitled, even if the party has nol demanded such relief in his 
pleadings." 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, Hi i I1 Jd I mo I I \ I H.ili !l»%). 
In i"n,'inviii!» .u linns III.TI1 im dismissal (m IMIIHIP In shile a claim for which relief 
may be granted, the Utah Supreme Court has also said as follows: 
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In reviewing the dismissal, we must keep in mind that the purpose of a rule 
12(b)(6) motion is to challenge the formal sufficiency of the claim for relief, 
not to establish the facts or resolve the merits of a case. 5A Charles A. Wright 
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990). We also 
note that a dismissal is justified only when the allegations of the complaint 
clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a claim. See UTAH R. Civ. 
P. 8(a) (stating that the only requirements of a complaint are that it contain a 
"short and plain statement... showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' and 
"a demand for judgment for the relief.") 
Whipple v. American Fork Irr. Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996). While some actions 
require particularized and specific allegations contained within the complaint, such as fraud, 
the instant case did not require such particularized and specific allegations. See, UT. R. CIV. 
P. 9(b). Aside from actions that involve fraud or defamation, the Utah Supreme Court has 
said as follows: 
It is evident from these statements that the fundamental purpose of our 
liberalized pleading rules is to afford parties "the privilege of presenting 
whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute," Cheney 
v. Rucker, supra, subject only to the requirement that their adversary have "fair 
notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication 
of the type of litigation involved." Blackham v. Snelgrove, supra. The 
functions of issue-formulation and fact-revelation are appropriately left to the 
deposition-discovery process. The rules "allow examination into and 
settlement of all issues bearing upon the controversy," Cheney v. Rucker, 
supra, with latitude for proof that extends beyond the pleadings, where 
appropriate. Rule 15(b). It also appears from the cited decisions that these 
principles are applied with great liberality in sustaining the sufficiency of 
allegations stating a cause of action or an affirmative defense. 
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co.. 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982) citing Blackham v. 
Snelgrove. 3 Utah 2d 157.160.280 P.2d 453.455 (1955) and Cheney v. Rucker. 14 Utah 2d 
205,211,381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963). 
8 
In the instant case, Smith filed the Complaint which contained the allegations that the 
('" i (y had not provided just compensatJ > •. n 
order to construct the SID. See, Complaint Smith sufficiently pled compliance with the SID 
statutes but was unable to further evidence such actions due to the trial court's Dismissal 
Order. Furthermore, Smith was unaware that the trial c •  : « it It w as treating the (" 11 \'i • I I < » 1 1 < 1 1 1 1 o 
Dismiss as one foi summary judgment ' I In is, Smith did not present further evidence at oral 
arguments to support the Complaint because he was not anticipating a showing on the merits, 
but that he need only demonstrate a claim that would require relief as a mattei of la \ * 
M in 11 i  1111 \ > 111 • , i, • < 111111 h I < 111 r s o I V i \ in 11 * mi i >< v< 11 i r e b e c a i lse Complaint contains statements 
of Smith's claims showing he is entitled to relief. See, Busche, supra. While Smith's action 
was dismissed on the basis that he failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted, 
Hft/tmii H.ilii iHifh t'iu"', l.ii!" iioticY Iothe 
City as to the nature and basis of Smith's claims and generally indicated the type of litigation 
involved. Id Furthermore, the City was entitled to notice of Smith s issues ai id an 
allowed an opportunity to prove his entitlement to relief because of the trial court's Dismissal 
Order. 
Smith's allegations contained in his Complaint demonstrate claims tl lat * c n ilcl < : • ititle 
II i i l l r In I Si«t Whipple, sttpm As sialnt :ili»o\t/\ Smith demonstrated allegations within 
the Complaint that would warrant relief, had he been given a chance to provide the trial court 
9 
with evidence in support of his claims. Furthermore, Smith was entitled to "notice of the 
issues raised and an opportunity to meet them." Jones at 1373. Smith was not given notice as 
to the trial court's intention to treat the City's Motion to Dismiss as one for summary 
judgment as evidenced by Smith only providing the trial court with the sufficiency of his 
claim not evidence to establish facts that would resolve the merits of the case. Whipple at 
1220. Smith provided the trial court with evidence that would require his action to survive a 
motion to dismiss but not one for summary judgment. Furthermore, the Dismissal Order was 
not justified because Smith's Complaint sufficiently detailed the allegations against the City 
and compliance with SID statutes. Id. Smith's Complaint sets forth legitimate contention, 
gives notice to the City concerning the claims, and indicates the type of litigation involved. 
Williams at 971. Therefore, the City's contention in Brief of Appellee that Smith's Complaint 
should show compliance with the SID statutes should be rejected since the Smith was not 
required to do so in preparing and filing the Complaint but did so nonetheless. 
B. Summary Judgment is Harmful in its Effect on Smith. 
In discussing error that would warrant reversal of a trial court's decision, the Utah 
Supreme Court has said, "[the error] must have been prejudicial. If the error was harmless, 
that is, if the error was sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that 
it affected the outcome of the case, then a reversal is not in order." Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 
1251, 1255 (Utah 1997) citing State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah 1997) 
(alteration added). The Utah Supreme Court has said, "we will look to see whether the error, 
10 
if any, should have been obvious and whether it was cured proeediii1,»11 \ ,IT id I havh\ » < < »I1I.,I «, 1 
harness Armed i-erees ins. bxchange v. Harrison, 2003 UI 14,11 22, 70 P.3d 35 citing 
State v.Germonto. 868 P.2d 50, 58 (Utah 1993). 
The Utah Supreme Court has also held the following concerning (lit grant 1 up ul 
summary judgmen >: 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary 
judgment is proper only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bangerter v. 
Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983). It should be granted only when it clearly 
appears that there is no reasonable probability that the party moved against 
could prevail. Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715 (Utah 1982). As 
this Court explained the standard: 
Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, depositions, 
affidavits and admissions show that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning 
questions of fact, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the 
opposing party. Thus, the court must evaluate all the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. 
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). See 
also Lockhart Co v. Equitable Realty Inc., 657 P,2d 1333 (Utah 
1983). 
Frisbee v.K & K Const. Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984). The Utah Supreme Court has 
further elaborated on the subject of summary judgments, stating, "[t]he purpose of summary 
judgment is to eliminate the time, trouble, and expense of 1 1.1I \\ 1 \\ I is < li'm .is a matter of 
l.iv Hi,i( llii (iiiil 1I1 ii .it'iiiiisl 11 ml entitled to prevail." Amiacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design 
Associates. 635 P.2d 53 (Utah 1981). 
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While the Utah Supreme Court has held that the grant of a summary judgment by a 
trial court is not a harsh rule, "[s]uch showing must preclude all reasonable possibility that 
the loser could, if given a trial, produce evidence which would reasonably sustain a judgment 
in his favor." Burningham v. Ott 525 P.2d 620, 621 (Utah 1974). However, the Court in 
Burningham did hold that "the evidence upon which one relies for judgment can be, and 
should be, known to the opponent; and when all the evidence is known, if there is no dispute 
on any material issue of fact, the rules provide that the court may apply the law and thus 
terminate the matter." Id. at 621-22. 
An earlier Utah Supreme Court case discusses the impact of summary judgment, 
stating, "[pjrior decisions point out that summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should be 
granted with reluctance. The plaintiffs should be granted the opportunity of producing 
whatever evidence they wish, including circumstantial evidence, in support of their 
contention." Houslev v. Anaconda Co., 19 Utah 2d 124,427 P.2d 390,392-393 (Utah 1967) 
citing Welchman v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 25,337 P.2d 410. The Utah Supreme Court has further 
stated that a summary judgment is a "drastic remedy and the courts should be reluctant to 
deprive litigants of an opportunity to fully present their contentions upon a trial. It should be 
granted only when under the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff he could 
not recover as a matter of law." Welchman v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 25,337 P.2d 410,411-412 
(Utah 1959). 
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In the instant case, it is clear from the record that Smith u a s preparing .1 i lHinsr 
against tl le City fs M< nionU 1 Dismis s,i lotfoi a motion for summary judgment. &^rr/a/J?r/e/I 
Smith's Trial Brief relied upon applicable law and the Complaint in this matter. While the 
City did provide affidavits and other documents for the Court's consideration, nowhere is it 
stipulated in the record that ourt would 
consider the City's Motion to Dismiss as one for summary judgment. Furthermore, the record 
demonstrates as cited supra that Smith was unaware that the trial court intended to treat the 
1 \tyls Motion to Dismiss as one f01 si 11 1: 111: 1:13:1:3/ f1 ldgment I J ndei I Jtal 1 lavs , Smith should have 
In i j 1 afforded the opportunity to provide the trial court with outside evidence to support his 
claims. The only material Smith was able to provide to the trial court was an affidavit from 
Frank Nichols because he did not know I it IVHIM in a i lopi 1101 JII< uilin ' iikidecnidciiee. 
1 trial court states that Smith had not supported his Complaint with 
outside evidence and erroneously relies on the City's affidavit from Kit Wareham. Since 
summary judgments cannot be granted when there aic dispiiii/d MMM.TIUI I«I« (V llu- liml < ourt 
< 1 irnl |v, piiintiiiji; ilk (*\\\" 1 1 UHI\ HI io Dismiss as one for summary judgment . 
In the instant case, the failure of the trial court to convert the City's Motion to Dismiss 
into one for summary judgment warrants reversal ol llir irml r r url's df* IM^II dm; in Hie 
prejudh ii.il 11,1 InI( • ,i* ( I »| 1  lit s ( « Nimlli Pn iv .tl I ' '^ The error was not inconsequential in 
that it barred Smith from going forward to prove entitlement for just compensation for the 
property taken by the City. Id. This error should have been obvious to the trial court. Anned 
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Forces at 22. The Dismissal Order dismissed the action against the City and terminated 
Smith's right to proceed with his action, when he was entitled to relief based upon the 
pleadings. Therefore, the error was not harmless. Id. 
However, should this Court find that the trial court did not err in granting the City's 
Motion to Dismiss as one for summary judgment, the standard for summary judgment was 
not met. Summary judgments can only be granted when it "clearly appears that there is no 
reasonable probability that the party moved against could prevail." Frisbee at 389. As set 
forth supra, there were clearly disputed facts between the parties as evidenced by the 
affidavits set forth and presented to the trial court. See, Affidavit of Kit Wareham and 
Affidavit of Frank Nichols. While Kit Wareham swore that there existed a contract that was 
not presented to the trial court, Frank Nichols9 affidavit specifically contradicted the stance 
of the City. The pleadings in this case showed a substantial amount of dispute over material 
facts. Id. Therefore, the trial court did not properly grant the Motion to Dismiss as one for 
summary judgment. Furthermore, it is not clear as a matter of law that Smith is not entitled 
to some recovery. Amjacs at 53. 
Smith asserts that summary judgment in this case was a drastic and inappropriate 
remedy. Given a trial, Smith would have been able to produce evidence that "would 
reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor." Burningham at 621. The trial court had not 
received all of the evidence that it should have considered for summary judgment. Thus, 
since the evidence was not known to the trial court through no fault of Smith's, the trial court 
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could not "apply the law and thus terminate the matter." " Id. at 621 622. Smith w as not 
allowed' In produce evident 'rder 
drastic and harmfiil to Smith. Houslev at 392-393. Smith was deprived of the opportunity to 
fully present his contentions upon further proceedings. Welchman at 411 -412. Therefore, the 
City's contention contained in its Brie] < >/ '/f; ipel lee that su iiiii larj judgmc i : t w as pi operand 
that Smith was advised that the trial court was treating the City's Motion to Dismiss as such 
should be rejected. 
II SMITH DID NOT INVITE ERROR BY INVITING THE TRIAL COURT TO 
CONSIDER CITY'S MOTION TO DISMISS AS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently discussed (In iii\ iln/il TI-OI don linn; II sink's us 
iiiillliin,» in iM'ilrnnil (Mil 
"Our invited error doctrine arises from the principle that a party cannot take 
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 49 1115, 128 P.3d 1171 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). By precluding appellate 
review, "the doctrine furthers this principle by 'discouraging parties from 
intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for 
reversal on appeal.'"/*/, (quotingState v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16,1112, 86 
P.3d 742); see State v. King, 2006 I IT 3, 1113, 131 P 3d 202 ("This rule is 
designed t< inhibit a defendant from foregoing ... an objection with the 
strategy of enhancing the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that 
strategy fails,... claiming on appeal that the court should reverse." (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). Further, parties are "not entitled to both the benefit 
of not objecting at trial and the benefit of objecting on appeal." King, at If 13 
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Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, HI 7, 164 P.3d 366. This case described how a party can 
affirmatively invite a court to commit error, stating, "invited error generally occurs in a more 
affirmative manner, such as where counsel stipulates to the court's instruction, states directly 
that there is no objection to a specific ruling of the court, or provides the court with erroneous 
authority upon which the court relies." Id. at 23 see State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 
(Utah 1987) ("[T]he fact remains that counsel consciously chose not to assert any objection 
that might have been raised and affirmatively led the trial court to believe that there was 
nothing wrong with the instruction."). 
The Utah Supreme Court has affirmed the invited error doctrine, stating as follows: 
The invited error doctrine prevents a party from taking "'advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the 
error.'" State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, If 15, 128 P.3d 1171 {quoting State v. 
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, If 9, 86 P.3d 742). "Affirmative representations that 
a party has no objection to the proceedings fall within the scope of the invited 
error doctrine because such representations reassure the trial court and 
encourage it to proceed without further consideration of the issues." Id. If 16. 
Tschaggenv v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, If 12, 163 P.3d 615. This Court has also 
examined the invited error doctrine, stating, "[t]he doctrine of invited error prohibits a party 
from setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it on appeal." State v. Redding, 2007 
UT App. 350, 1J24, 172 P.3d 319 citing State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201,1205 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, "[o]n appeal, a party cannot 
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take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error." Id., see State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). 
In the instant case, the record shows that Smith was not advised or put on notice that 
the trial court was considering the City's Motion to Dismiss as one for summary judgment. 
The record does not indicate at all that Smith stipulated to the trial court treating the motion 
as such. Furthermore, the City's contention in its Brief of Appellee lacks merit and should not 
be considered by this Court as a valid basis to reject review of Smith's claims of error made 
by the trial court. 
Smith did not lead the trial court into committing error when it granted the City's 
Motion to Dismiss as one for summary judgment. Pratt at ^17. The City was the party who 
filed for dismissal and Smith simply responded to their dismissal. However, Smith was not 
advised that the trial court was viewing the City's Motion to Dismiss as one for summary 
judgment as evidenced by the record. Smith was attempting to survive the grounds of 
dismissal based upon UT. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) not UT. R. CIV. P. 56. Smith had no agenda to 
preserve a "hidden ground for reversal on appeal." Pratt at^|17. While Smith is aware of the 
invited error doctrine, it does not apply to this case because he was unaware that the trial 
court was considering the motion for dismissal as one for summary judgment, because he did 
not affirmatively act through stipulation to the trial court viewing its motion to dismiss as one 
for summary judgment. Id. Smith did not provide the trial court with erroneous authority 
upon which the trial court relied in issuing its Dismissal Order. Id. Smith did not reassure the 
17 
trial court and encourage it to proceed with its decision to dismiss the action as one for 
summary judgment. Tschaggeny at U12. Smith did not set up the trial court to commit an 
error only to now complain about it on appeal, because the facts do not exist or warrant such 
behavior. Redding at ^24. As this Court is surely to ascertain upon review of the record for 
this case, the City is mistaken in its contention that Smith invited the trial court to commit 
error. Thus, its contention should be rejected. 
III. THE SHOWING REQUIRED TO SURVIVE A MOTION TO DISMISS 
DIFFERS FROM THAT OF A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE state in relevant part concerning motions to 
dismiss as follows: 
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, 
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
UT. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The Utah Supreme Court has previously analyzed motions to dismiss 
that can be converted into motions for summary judgment. The Court said in pertinent part: 
We hold that it is necessary that the record clearly and affirmatively 
demonstrate that when a motion to dismiss is made and " . . . matters outside 
the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court. . ." UTAH R. 
CIV. P. 12(b)... that all parties (including, of course, the non-movant which 
was the plaintiff in this case) are given reasonable opportunity to present 
additional pertinent material if they wish. See, Advisory Committee Note in 
Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 2A, Par. 12.01(9), p. 2215 (It will also be 
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observed that if a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is thus converted into a summary 
judgment motion, the amendment insures that both parties shall be given a 
reasonable opportunity to submit affidavits and extraneous proofs to avoid 
taking a party by surprise through the conversion of the motion into a motion 
for summary judgment.) 
Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n, 587 P.2d 151,152 (Utah 
1978). The Utah Supreme Court has also stated that summary judgment is "never used to 
determine what the facts are, but only to ascertain whether there are any material issues of 
fact in dispute. If there be any such disputed issues of fact, they cannot be resolved by 
summary judgment even when the parties properly bring the motion before the court." Hill v. 
Grand Central, Inc.. 25 Utah 2d 121,123, 477 P.2d 150 (Utah 1970). 
This Court has previously analyzed motions to dismiss, stating in pertinent part as 
follows: 
Moreover, "[w]hen determining whether a trial court properly dismissed an 
action under rule 12(b)(6), we assume that the factual allegations in the 
complaint are true and we draw all reasonable inferences in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff." Cazares v. Cosby, 2003 UT 3,1113, 65 P.3d 1184 
(quotations and citations omitted). "A rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is merely a 
recognition by a trial court that a plaintiffs claim for relief is formally 
deficient," id. at HI4; therefore, "[a] motion to dismiss is appropriate only 
where it clearly appears that the plaintiff or plaintiffs would not be entitled to 
relief under the facts alleged or under any state of facts they could prove to 
support their claim/' Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764,766 (Utah 1991). See also 
Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996) 
("[T]he purpose of a rule 12(b)(6) motion is to challenge the formal 
sufficiency of the claim for relief, not to establish the facts or resolve the 
merits of a case."). 
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Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Reber, 2004 UT App. 420, H10, 103 P.3d 186. This Court in Sony 
determined that, under the circumstances, the trial court improperly dismissed the action as a 
12 (b)(6) motion because it relied on documents outside of the complaint and the documents 
attached thereto and therefore should have treated the motion as one for summary judgment. 
M a t 111111-12. 
Furthermore, in Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., the Utah Supreme Court held that 
Thayne failed to support his motion against summary judgment because he did not provide 
outside evidence to support his pleadings. Ibid, 874 P.2d 120, 124-125 (Utah,1994). The 
court in Thayne stated as follows in pertinent part: 
[Thayne] did not file any affidavits in support of his complaint, nor did he 
attempt to present any other evidence. In the face of Beneficial's properly 
supported motion, however, Thayne may not rest on his unverified complaint. 
We have indicated that general allegations in an unverified complaint are an 
insufficient basis for opposing a properly supported motion for summary 
judgment. D&L Supply, 775 P.2d at 421; Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224, 
226-27 (Utah 1983). Thayne simply did not meet his burden of presenting 
some evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, raising a credible issue of material 
fact. Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624, 637 (1960). 
Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "[a] dismissal is a severe measure and should be 
granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is not entitled to relief under any state 
of facts which could be proved in support of its claim." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 
P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990) citins Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457,460,243 
P.2d 441, 443 (1952). The court in Colman went on to state, "[t]he courts are a forum for 
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settling controversies, and if there is any doubt about whether a claim should be dismissed 
for the lack of a factual basis, the issue should be resolved in favor of giving the party an 
opportunity to present its proof.'9 Id. citing Baur v. Pacific Fin. Corp., 14 Utah 2d 283,284, 
383 P.2d 397, 397 (1963). The Court in Colman further analyzed UT. R. CIV. P. 12(b) as it 
applied to the case. Id. at 125. The court stated as follows: 
The rule states, "[A]ll parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present 
all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." UTAH R.CIV.P. 
12(b). This rule gives the opposing party an opportunity to gather evidence to 
rebut the movant's evidence. Without such a rule, one party could have the 
benefit of significant, supporting evidence while the other party would be left 
to rely solely on the unsubstantiated pleadings. 
This rule has much "practical bearing on the proper outcome" of this case. The 
State and Southern Pacific moved for dismissal based on Colman's failure to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Colman responded to these 
motions with a memorandum opposing the motions to dismiss, which focused 
exclusively on points of law. Colman appears to have assumed at that point 
that the rule 12 standard would be followed. His memorandum began by 
stating, "For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the truth of the Complaint's fact 
allegations must be assumed." Colman was not given reasonable opportunity to 
present additional evidence pursuant to rule 12(b). Had Colman known that the 
State would rely on the preliminary injunction evidence, he could have 
submitted other evidence to the trial court rebutting that evidence. 
Furthermore, the trial court treated the motion to dismiss only under rule 12 
and not under rule 56. The trial court did not make any factual findings in 
denying Colman's motion for a preliminary injunction. The trial court 
specifically stated that it only ruled that plaintiff had not met his burden of 
proof for a preliminary injunction and that its ruling was not dispositive of any 
other issues. The trial court also refused to order Colman to order the transcript 
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of the preliminary injunction proceedings for this appeal. In granting the 
State's motion to dismiss, the trial court only entered conclusions of law. 
Id. The Utah Supreme Court has also iterated, "[e]ven where a motion is erroneously 
characterized as a motion to dismiss, if matters outside the pleadings are presented and not 
excluded, the motion is properly treated as one for summary judgment." Lind v. Lynch, 665 
P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1983). 
In the instant case, as argued and cited to supra, Smith was unaware of the trial court's 
intention to treat the City's Motion to Dismiss as one for summary judgment. While it is 
Smith's contention that the trial court did not properly convert the City's Motion to Dismiss 
as one for summary judgment, the trial court also did not provide Smith with a "reasonable 
opportunity to present all materials made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." UTAH R. 
CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The record in this case does not "clearly and affirmatively demonstrate" 
that Smith was given reasonable opportunity to present additional pertinent material for the 
trial court's determination of the merits. Bekins at 152. Furthermore, since the trial court did 
not properly convert the dismissal motion into one for summary judgment, Smith was not 
allowed to present further evidence outside the pleadings before the trial court issued its 
decision granting dismissal. Id. 
As argued herein, Smith was preparing against a motion to dismiss which requires a 
showing that the claim is sufficient. Furthermore, there were several factual disputes 
between the parties. The affidavits submitted by the parties contradicted each other in 
22 
content. See, Affidavits of Kit Wareham and Frank Nichols. Therefore, the trial court granting 
summary judgment in this matter was improper because there was dispute over material facts. 
Sony at II10. Additionally, the trial court stated in its Dismissal Order that Smith had failed 
to state a claim for which relief could be granted, which is a dismissal under UT. R. CIV. P. 
12 (b)(6), but then dismissed the action as a summary judgment. See, Dismissal Order at p. 
3. Smith asserts that this is improper because the trial court failed to give notice that it was 
treating the dismissal motion as one for summary judgment, the trial court failed to properly 
convert the Motion to Dismiss to one for summary judgment, and improperly granted the 
summary judgment even in light of the disputed material facts at issue. Since there were 
material issues of fact in dispute between the parties, the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment. Hill at 123. 
The record clearly indicates that, while Smith did submit an affidavit by Frank 
Nichols, it was in response to the City's Motion to Strike. In that motion, the City alleged that 
Smith had submitted to the Court an unsupported statement of fact. Motion to Strike at p. 1. 
Although the trial court viewed the dismissal motion as one for summary judgment, Frank 
Nichols1 affidavit supported Smith's allegations contained in the Complaint. See, Affidavit of 
Frank Nichols. Therefore, even if the trial court was correct in its granting of the summary 
judgment, it was incorrect in stating that Smith had not provided evidence outside the 
pleadings to support the Complaint. Dismissal Order at p. 2. Therefore, the trial court acted 
on an insufficient basis to grant a summary judgment. Thayne at 125. Smith properly raised 
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an issue of material fact, albeit unaware that the trial court was viewing the Motion to 
Dismiss as one for summary judgment. Id. 
In preparation for the trial court's decision of the action, Smith prepared his pleadings 
to show entitlement to relief under a "state of facts which could be proved in support of its 
claim." Colman at 624. The trial court erred in granting the summary judgment because the 
disputed facts cast doubt on whether the claim should have been dismissed for the lack of 
factual basis. Id. Therefore, the trial court should have erred on the side of caution and 
resolved the issue in favor of Smith. Id. UT. R. CIV. P. 56 exists to provide both parties with 
the opportunity to present evidence in support of their positions outside the pleadings. Id. at 
125. Like Colman, Smith assumed that the Rule 12 standard would be followed by the trial 
court. Id. And, like Colman, Smith was not given the opportunity to provide the trial court 
with further evidence in support of the claims alleged in the pleadings. Id. Therefore, the trial 
court erred by granting the summary judgment. Thus, the City's contention in its Brief of 
Appellee that Smith was aware of the trial court's decision to treat the Motion to Dismiss as 
one for summary judgment and that the decision was proper is without merit and should be 
rejected by this Court. 
[Remainder of page left intentionally blank] 
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rnNCLUSlON 
deems necessary. 
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